Plato: Eryxias; or On Wealth

Socrates Eryxias Critias Erasistratus　

Socrates.
We happened to be taking a walk, myself and Eryxias, of the ward of Steiria, in the portico of Zeus, who presides over Freed-men, and there came to us Critias the son of Phseax, (and) the nephew of Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus happened at that time to be recently arrived from Sicily and those places ; and on approaching near he said—“Hail, Socrates.” And (hail) too thou, said I. What then, can you tell us of any news from Sicily ? And very (good) too, said he ; but are you willing for us to sit down first ? for I am tired from having walked yesterday from Megara. Perfectly so, (said I,) if it seems good to you. What then of the events there, said he, do you wish to hear the first ? Is it of the people there, themselves, what they are doing, or how they are affected towards this state of ours ? For they appear to me to be in a case similar to wasps; for if any one excites the latter in any slight manner to anger, they become difficult to battle against, until one falls upon them and destroys them nest and all. So, I think, are the people of Syracuse. For unless, after entertaining angry feelings, one shall go thither with a very large fleet, it is not possible for them to come under our power ; but by all these little doings they will be enraged the more, so as to become the most difficult of all (to manage); and they have just now sent ambassadors, intending, as it seems to me, to deceive in some way the state.

During our conversation the ambassadors from Syracuse happened to pass by; when, pointing to one of them, Erasistratus observed—That person, Socrates, said he, is the most wealthy of the Siceliotes and Italiotes ; and how should he not be, who has land without stint; so that it is easy for him, if one wished it, to cultivate a great deal of it; and it is of such a kind, that there is none other so good, at least amongst the Greeks; and he has still many things leading to wealth, chattels, (and) slaves, and horses, and gold and silver. On seeing him excited, as if about to dilate upon the man's substance, I asked him—What kind of person, Erasistratus, does this man seem to be in Sicily ? This man, said he, both seems to be and is the most knavish of all the Siceliotes and Italiotes, by how much he is the wealthiest; so that, should you be willing to ask any Siceliote whom he thought to be the greatest rogue, not one would mention any other person than him.

Conceiving then that he was holding a conversation not upon trifling matters, but what seemed to be the greatest, namely, virtue and wealth, I asked him which would he say is the wealthier person, he, who happened to have two talents of silver, or he, who had a field worth two talents? I think, said he, the person who has the field. By the same rule then, said I, he, who happens to have garments, or bed furniture, or other goods of greater value than are those, which the stranger possesses, would be the wealthier. To this he assented. Now, should any one give you the choice, which would you wish ? I would wish that, said he, which is the most valuable. Would you not (say so), as conceiving yourself to be more wealthy ? Just so. For the present then he appears to be the wealthiest, who possesses things the most valuable. Yes, said he. Would not then, said I, persons in health be more wealthy than those who are ill ? at least if health is a possession more valuable than the property of a person who is ill. For surely there is no one, who would not set a higher value on health, although he possessed only a little money, than on illness, although he possessed the property of the great king, through his conceiving, it is plain, that health is of greater value; for he would never prefer it, unless he considered it of greater value than property. He would not. If then any thing else seems to be of greater value than health, the person, who possesses that thing, would be the wealthiest. Yes. If then a person were to come to us and ask—Can you, Socrates, and Eryxias, and Erasistratus, tell me, what possession is the most valuable to man ? Is it not that, by possessing which a person would deliberate the best on this point, how he could best transact his own affairs and those of his friends ? What should we say is this ? To myself it appears, Socrates, that happiness is the thing of the greatest value to man. And not wrongly so, said I. But shall we consider those the most happy, who are the best to do ? To me those appear so. Would not those then be the best to do, who err the least, in the case of themselves and the rest of mankind, and regulate affairs the most successfully? By all means. They then, who know what is evil and what is good, and what is to be done and what is not, would regulate affairs the most successfully, and err the least. To this too he consented. Now then, the same persons appear to be the wisest, and the best to do, and the happiest, and the wealthiest; if indeed wisdom is a possession of the greatest value. Yes. But, said Erasistratus, taking up the discourse, of what advantage would food and drink, and if there is any thing else of this kind, be to a person, if he were wiser than Nestor, and yet did not happen to have the necessaries of life ? How would his wisdom be a benefit ? Or how could he be the wealthiest, when nothing prevents him from being poor, while he possesses no resources for the necessaries (of life) ? And he thought indeed he had said something extremely (well). But would the person, said I, who possesses wisdom, suffer in this way, even if he were in want of these things ? For if a person possessed the residence of Polytion, and the residence were full of gold and silver, would he be in want of nothing ? Nay, said he, there is nothing to prevent that person from immediately disposing of his property, and obtaining in return for it whatever he happens to want for. his living, or money even ; in exchange for which he will be able to procure them,1 and to have on the instant all things in plenty. Provided, said I, persons existing happen to be in want of his residence, more than of the wisdom of that person ; since, if they were such as to value more the wisdom of the man, and what results from it, he would have much more to dispose of, if he happened to be in want of any thing, and wished to dispose both of it and the works resulting from it. Surely of the residence the use happens to be much and necessary; and great is the difference to a person in the case of things relating to life, as regards his living in a dwelling of this kind, or in a small and mean tenement; but of wisdom the use costs little, and slight is the difference for a person to be wise or untaught in questions of the greatest moment. And oh! that men should despise the one, and not be buyers of it! but that of cypress for their residence, and Pentelican marble, many should be in want, and willing to purchase ! Now would not a person, if he were a clever pilot, or a skilful physician, and able to practise well and creditably his art, or any other of such kind of arts, be of greater value than 'any one whatever' of those of the greatest possessions according to substance ? and would not he, who is able to deliberate well both for himself and another, how he might do the best, be able to dispose (of his skill), if he wished to do so?

(On this) Eryxias, taking up the discourse, and looking with his eyes under, as if he had been injuriously treated, observed—And would you, Socrates, if one must speak the truth of you, assert that you are wealthier than Callias, the son of Hipponicus ? And yet you would acknowledge that you are not less taught (than he is) on matters of the greatest moment, but wiser rather; and still you are not on this account the wealthier. For perhaps you imagine, Eryxias, said I, that these arguments, which we are now discussing, are a sport, since the facts are not really so ; but that they are like pebbles in the pebble-game, which if a person cleverly brings forward, he will be able to cause the opposite players to be beaten, so as not to have what they can bring forward against those movements. Perhaps then you imagine, that matters are thus without any reference to the rich; and that there are certain arguments in no respects either true or false, by detailing which, a person may get the better of his opponents, how that the wisest are likewise the wealthiest, and by saying these of such a kind of falsehood of persons saying true. And perhaps there is nothing wonderful in this; just as if two persons should be speaking about letters, one asserting that sigma begins the word Socrates, but the other alpha, the argument of the party, who says that alpha begins, should be superior to his, who says that sigma does.

And, looking round to the parties present, Eryxias observed, smiling at the same time, and blushing, as if he had not been present during what had been said before, I did not imagine, Socrates, that there was any need of arguments of that kind, by which a person would be able to persuade not one of those, who are present, nor be benefited by them. For who is there with any intellect, who would be persuaded that the richest are the wisest ? but would rather be informed with greater delight, if it is necessary to talk about being wealthy, from whence it is honourable to be wealthy, and from whence disgraceful, and what it is to be wealthy, whether a good or an evil. Be it so, said I. Henceforth then we will be on our guard ; and you do right in admonishing me. But why do not you yourself, since you have introduced the subject, endeavour to state whether it seems to you to be a good or an evil to be wealthy ? especially since the previous arguments do not appear to have been spoken with reference to this point.

To myself then for the present it seems that to be wealthy is a good. But while he was still desirous to state something, Critias suddenly interrupted him (by saying)— Tell me, Eryxias, do you consider it a good to be wealthy ? Yes, I do, by Zeus. For I should be mad (if I did not) ; and I think there is not a single person, who would not say so too. And yet, said the other, I think too that there is not a single person, whom I could not cause to say with myself that to some men it is an evil to be wealthy. If then it were a good, it would not have appeared to some to be an evil. Hereupon I said to them that—If ye happened to be at variance about this point, which of you two is speaking with the greater truth about horsemanship, how a person would ride the best, and had I myself happened to be skilled in horsemanship, I would have endeavoured to cause you to cease from your differences in opinion; for I should have been ashamed had I not, if present, prevented, as far as I could, your being at variance ; or if you had been at variance upon any other matter whatever, and were about to separate not at all, unless you agreed upon this, rather as enemies instead of being friends. But now, since you happen to be at variance upon an affair of this kind, of which there must needs be the use through the whole of life, and a great difference, whether we are to attend to it, as being beneficial or not; and this too as being a part not of trifling questions, but of those that are thought to be the greatest by the Greeks, since fathers recommend this as the first point to their children, as soon as they arrive at the age for reflecting upon 5what they ought; and6 they seem to consider from whence they shall become wealthy ; 1 so that should you possess anything you are worth something, but if not, nothing. If then this object is made so violently a serious pursuit, and you, who agree on other matters, differ upon this one of such great moment, and still in addition you are at variance on the question of wealth, not whether it is of a black colour or white, nor whether of a light weight or heavy, but whether it is an evil or a good, so as even to be arrayed to the extreme of enmity, should you be at variance about things evil and good, and this too, although you are friends as much as possible, and relations, I will not, as far as rests with myself, neglect you, while at variance with each other; but, if I were able myself, I would tell you how the case stands, and cause you to cease from your difference (in opinion). But now, since I happen to be not able, and each of. you thinks himself able to cause the other to agree with him, I am prepared to take a part (in the discussion), as far as I can, in order that it may be agreed upon by you how the matter stands. Do you then, Critias, said I, endeavour to cause us to agree with you, as you have undertaken to do.

I would, said he, as I have begun, gladly ask Eryxias here, whether there seem to him to be men unjust and just. By Zeus, said he, and very much so. Well then, to act unjustly seems it to you to be an evil or a good ? To me at least an evil. Would a man, who commits adultery with his neighbours' wives by means of money, seem to you to act unjustly ? and this too when the state and the laws forbid it. To me at least he would seem to act unjustly. Consequently, said he, if the unjust man happens to be wealthy, and both able and willing to expend money, he would go astray ; but if it were not his fortune to be rich, he would not have the means of expending, nor would he be able to accomplish what he wished, so that he would not even go astray. Hence it would be a greater benefit to the party to be not wealthy, since he would the less accomplish what he wished. Now he wished to do what was wrong. And again, would you say that to be ill is an evil or a good? I would say an evil. Well then, do there seem to you to be some men, who are without self-control ? Yes, to me at least. If then it were better for a person of this kind for the sake of his health to abstain from food and drink, and the rest of things that are thought to be pleasant, while he is unable (to do so) through his want of self-control, it would be better for- that person, that there should not be from whence he could procure those things for himself, rather than have a great superfluity in the necessaries (of life) ; for thus there would not be the power for him to go astray, not even if he vehemently wished it.

So well and beautifully was Critias thought to have spoken, that had not Eryxias felt a respect for those, who were present, nothing would have prevented him from getting up and striking Critias; of so great a thing did he deem himself to have been deprived ; since it was evident to him, that he had previously formed not a correct opinion on the subject of wealth. Perceiving then that Eryxias was in this state, and careful that abuse and opposition should not proceed too far, I remarked, that Prodicus, the wise man of Ceos, had, when detailing this very argument, seemed to those, who were present, to be such a trifler as to be unable to persuade a single person present that he was speaking what was true; and thereupon a lad very young and a clever talker, who was sitting by, laughed at and jeered him, and put him up, desirous to get at the reasons for what he was saying; and in truth he became in much higher repute amongst the auditors than Prodicus himself. Might you have it in your power, said Erasistratus, to tell us his reasons ? Completely so, if indeed I remember it. For it was, I think, something to this effect.

The lad asked him, in what way he conceived wealth to be an evil, and in what a good ? when he taking up the discourse, observed—Just as you do likewise, that to persons beautiful in body and mind it is a good, and to such as know how to use it, to these likewise it is a good; but to the depraved and those who do not know, it is an evil. And all the rest of things, said he, are in this state. For of what kind are some of those, who make use of things, such to them it is necessary for the things to be; and prettily, said he, appears to have been put into verse the sentiment of Archilochus—As the actions are men meet with, so the thoughts are, which they frame.“ Now then, said the lad, if any one should make me wise in that very wisdom, by which the good become wise men, it is necessary for him to make at the same time the rest of things good for me, without his troubling himself at all about those very things, because he has made me wise instead of being untaught; as if a person should make me now a grammarian, it is necessary for him to make the rest of things grammatical for me; and if a musician, musical; just as when he makes me good, (it is necessary) to have made things good at the same time for me. To the latter assertion Prodicus however did not assent; although he acknowledged the former. Does it seem to you, said he, that as it is the work of a man to make a dwelling, so it is to make things good ? or is it necessary for things to continue to the end to be such, as they may have been at the commencement, whether evil or good ? And Prodicus seemed to me to suspect to what point the argument was about to proceed in so very clever a manner ; (and), in order that he might not appear before all present to be confuted by the lad—for he thought it would be a thing of indifference for him to suffer this when alone—he said it was the work of a man. Does virtue, said (the lad), seem to you a thing to be taught, or is it innate ? To be taught, he replied, at least by me. Would not then, said he, a person appear to be silly, if he thought that, by praying to the gods, he should become a grammarian or a musician, or obtain any other science, which it is necessary for a person to obtain by either learning from another or discovering himself? To this too he assented. Do not you then, Prodicus, said the lad, when you pray to the gods to do well, and for good things to happen, pray at that, time for nothing else but to become beautiful in body and mind; since to men beautiful in body and mind things likewise happen to be good, but bad to the depraved. If then virtue happens to be able to be taught, you would appear to be praying for nothing else than to be taught, what you do not know.

I said then to Prodicus, that he seemed to me to have suffered a thing of not a trifling kind, if he had happened to fail in this; at least if he conceived that, what we pray for from the gods, would take place even at the same time. For should you go in haste on each occasion to a city, and in your prayers ask of the gods to give good things, you nevertheless would not know whether they are able to give you what you happen to ask for, as you would do, if you were to go to the doors of a grammar-master, and beg of him to impart the knowledge of grammar, and to trouble himself about nothing else but the science, which you can receive on the instant, and (by which) you will be able to do the works of the grammar-master. On my saying this, Prodicus directed his course to the lad, as about to defend himself, and to make a display, as you have done just now, and taking it to heart should he appear to have prayed to the gods in vain. And thereupon the ruler of the Gymnasium advancing, bade him take himself away from the Gymnasium, as he was conversing upon subjects not suited to young persons; and if not suited, evidently wrong. This account have I detailed for the sake of this, that you may see how situated are the persons engaged in philosophy. For if Prodicus had been present, and spoken thus, he would have appeared to those present to be so mad, as to be ejected even from the Gymnasium. But you seem to have now talked so extremely well, as not only to have persuaded those present, but to cause likewise the speaker on the opposite side to agree with you; (and) it is evident that, as in courts of law, if two persons happened to give the same evidence, one seeming to be correct in body and mind, but the other depraved (in both), the judges would, on account of the testimony of the depraved character, be not at all convinced ; but, as it might happen, do even the reverse ; but if the person, who seemed to be correct in body and mind, had so stated (alone), the statement would have seemed to be vehemently true. Perhaps then the parties are situated in some such manner with respect to yourself and Prodicus ; and one they consider a sophist and a vain talker, but yourself a statesman and a man of much worth; and then they imagine that they ought not to look to the speech itself, but to the speakers, of what kind they may be. But nevertheless, said Erasistratus, although you are speaking in ridicule, Socrates, it seems to myself at least, that Critias appears to say something (well). Nay, said I, by Zeus, nothing whatever. But why, since you have conversed upon these matters well and beautifully, do you not finish what remains of your discourse ? For there seems to me something still remaining of the inquiry, especially since this appears to be acknowledged, that (wealth) is to some a good, but to others an evil. There remains then to inquire what is wealth in the abstract. For if we do not know this first, we shall not be able to agree as to what portion is an evil, and what a good; and I am prepared, as far as I can, to make the inquiry with you. Let then the person, who asserts that to be wealthy is a good, say on this point how the case happens to be.

Nay, said he, I do not, Socrates, define wealth in any way more cleverly than the rest of mankind. For this is to be wealthy, to possess much money. And I conceive that Critias here does not think that to be wealthy is any thing else. Even thus, said I, there will be something still left to consider, of what kind is the money, in order that you may not shortly afterwards appear to be at variance on this point again. For instance, you know that the Carthaginians make use of money of this kind. In a small skin there is bound up as much as is the weight of a stater at most. But what is so bound up within, no one knows, except those who make it up. They then deem it a legal tender, when a seal has been put upon it; and he, who possesses the greatest number of these skins, is thought to possess the most money, and to be the wealthiest. But if any one amongst us were in possession of such things to the greatest amount, he would be not a whit more wealthy, than if he possessed many pebbles from the mountain ; but at Lacedaemon they deem a weight of iron a legal tender, and this when it is the useless part of iron; and he, who possesses a great weight of such kind of iron, is thought to be wealthy; but elsewhere its possession is worth nothing; while in ^Ethiopia they make use of engraved stones, of which a man of Laconia would not have the power to make any use. But amongst the nomad Scythians, if a person possessed the residence of Polytion, he would be thought to be not at all more wealthy, than if a person amongst us were the owner of the mountain Lycabettus. It is plain then that each of these things cannot be property; since some of those, who have possessed them, appear to have been not at all more wealthy on this account. But each of these, said I, exist in reality as property to some persons, and they who possess them are wealthy; but to others they are not property, nor are persons on this account more wealthy; just as the same things are neither honourable nor disgraceful to all, but different to different persons. If then we are willing to inquire why amongst the Scythians houses are not property, but are so with us; or why amongst the Carthaginians skins are so, but not with us ; or why amongst the Lacedasmonians iron is property, but not with us, should we not discover (the reason) best in this way? For example, should any one at Athens possess a thousand talents-weight of the stones in the Market-place, of which we make no use, is it that he would be deemed to be wealthier on that account ? It appears not, at least to me. But if be possessed a thousand talents-weight of the stone called lychnite, we should say that he was very wealthy. Very indeed. Is it, said I, on this account, because the latter is useful to us, but the former useless ? Yes. Especially since amongst the Scythians houses are on this account not property to them, because they have no use for a house ; nor would a Scythian put any value upon the most beautiful house for himself rather than a sheep-skin cloak; because the latter is useful to him, but the former useless. Again, on the other hand, we do not consider the money of Carthage as property. For there is not an article of those we are in want of, which we can carry off by it, as we can by silver ; so that it would be useless to us. It is likely. Whatever things then happen to be useful to us, these are property; but whatever are useless, are not property. How is this, Socrates ? said Eryxias, taking up the discourse. Is there not what we make use of for conversing with each other, and for doing a hurt, and many other things ? And would these be a property? And yet they appear to be useful. Not even thus then has it appeared to us what is a property. For that it is necessary that a property, if it is about to exist at all, should be useful, is acknowledged nearly by all. But what is the kind of property, since it is not of every kind. Come then (say), if we are to pursue the inquiry again in this way, would what we are in search of be discovered still better, (by asking) what is that, for which we make use of property, and for what has the possession of property been discovered, as drugs have for causing diseases to go away? for perhaps it would thus become more clear. Since then it seems a thing of necessity, that, whatever happens to be property, must be useful likewise, and that of things useful there is one kind, which we call property, it will still be left to inquire, for what need are the things, which are meet to be called property, useful ? For all things are equally useful, of which we make use for any4 operation, just as all that have life are living things ; of which living things one kind we call man. If then a person were to ask us—By what thing being removed out of the way shall we have no need of the physician's art, nor of its instruments ? we should be able to say—If diseases were removed from our bodies, and did not exist at all, or if existing, were removed on the instant. Of sciences then the medical is, as it seems, that, which is useful for this purpose, to cause the removal of diseases. And if a person should again ask us—By the removal of what thing are we in no need of property, should we be able to tell ? But if not, let us consider the matter thus. Come (say), if a man could live without food and drink, and were neither hungry nor thirsty, is there a reason why he should want those very things, or silver, or any thing else, in order that he might obtain them ? To myself at least it does not seem (he would). In the same manner then are the rest of things. For if we did not want the things, of which we are at present in want, for the care of the body, namely, both of warmth and of cold sometimes, and of the other things, of which the body '[being deficient]' is in want, that, which is called property, would be not used by us; at least if no one wanted at all any one of these things, for the sake of which we should wish to possess property, in order that awe may possess what is sufficient for our desires, and the wants of the body, of which we may on each occasion stand in need. If then the possession of property is useful for this purpose, namely, the attention to the wants of the body, should this be taken away from the midst of us, we should not be in want of property, and property would perhaps not exist at all. It appears so. It appears then, as is likely, that what are useful for this doing of things, are property. That such was property he acknowledged indeed ; the reasoning nevertheless troubled him exceedingly. But what are these kind of things ? (said he). Shall we say that the same thing can be useful for the same operation at one time, but useless at another ? I would not say so; but if we have any want of the same thing3 for the same operation, it seems to me it would be useful; but if not, not. Hence, if we could work up a brazen image without fire, we should not be in want of fire for such an operation; and if we did not want it, it would not be useful to us. And the same reasoning applies to the rest of things. It appears so. Of such things then as it is possible for a thing to exist without them, not one of them would appear to be useful, at least for that thing. It would not. If then we should appear at any time able, without silver and gold, and the rest of such kind of things, which we do not use for the body, as we do food, and drink, and clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, to cause the wants of the body to cease, [so that there is no longer a need of them,] neither silver nor gold nor the rest of things would appear to be useful for it, if it were able to exist without them. They would not. Nor would those things appear to be property, unless they were useful. But those things would be (property), by which we are able to obtain what are useful.

I could never, Socrates, be able to be persuaded of this, that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not property. For of this I am strongly persuaded, that, as things without use are not property, so of things the most useful property is useful for it. Nevertheless (I am not persuaded) of this, that these things happen to be not useful to us ; since by them we obtain the necessaries (of life). Come then (say), how shall we speak of these things ? Are there not certain persons, who teach music or letters, or any other science, who in return for such instruction obtain for themselves the necessaries (of life) by bargaining for a remuneration for such things ? There are. Would not then these persons by such science obtain for themselves the necessaries (of life), by making an exchange for it, as we now do for gold and silver ? I confess it. If then they obtain by this act, what they make use of for living, this act would be useful for their living; for we have said that silver is useful on this account, that we are enabled by it to procure what is necessary for the body. It is so, said he.

If then the sciences of things useful for it are these, sciences would appear to be property for the very same reason that gold and silver are. It is evident. It is evident too that those, who possess these sciences, are rather wealthy. But we admitted a little before with so much difficulty the reasoning, whether they were the wealthiest. But from what has been just now admitted, this would of necessity happen, that the rather intelligent are rather wealthy. For should a person ask us—Do we think that a horse is a useful thing for every man ? Would you not say that, to those who know how to use a horse, it would be a useful thing, but to those who do not know, not ? I should say so. Then said I, by the same rule a drug is not useful for every man, but only to him, who happens to know how to take it ? I say so. Are not then all the rest of things in a similar condition ? It is likely. Gold then and silver and the rest of things, which are thought to be property, would be useful to him alone, who happens to know how to use them. Just so. Did it not seem before to be the part of persons superior both in body and mind to know where and how to make use of each of these things ? I admit it. To those men alone then, who are superior in body and mind, these things would be useful; since they (alone) know how to use them. If then they are useful to these alone, to these alone they would appear to be property. Is it so? It is likely. Him too, who is unskilled in horsemanship, yet possesses horses that happen to be useless to him, should a person render skilful, would he not at the same time make him more wealthy, since he makes things to be useful to him which previously happened to be useless ? For by imparting skill to the person he at the same time makes him wealthy likewise. It seems so. And yet I think I could swear on behalf of Critias, that he is persuaded by none of these arguments. (And truly so), by Zeus. For I should be mad if I were persuaded. But why have you not completed that part of the argument, how that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not, although they seem to be, property ? since I am very much delighted to hear those arguments, which you happen to be just now going through. Thereupon I observed that you appear to me, Critias, to be thus delighted at hearing me, as are such of the rhapsodists, as chant the verses of Homer ; since not one of these arguments are thought by you to be true. Come then (and say) nevertheless, how shall we speak upon such matters ? Would you not say that there are some3 things ever useful to house-builders for making a dwelling ? So it seems at least to me. Whether then shall we say that those things would be useful, which they' make use of for house-building, namely, stones and bricks, and wood, and if there be any thing else of this kind ? or that there are tools, with which they make the dwelling, and by which they obtain these things, namely, the wood and the stone, and again, the tools for them ? To myself at least it seems, said he, that all these (the tools) are useful for those (the materials). Hence, said I, in the case of the rest of operations, not only are those things (useful), which we make use of for each of the works, but those also, by which we obtain them, and without which they would not exist. It is entirely so. Hence, both for those, who possess these (the tools), and if there be any thing further up, and for those who possess these (the materials) and what is further up, so that at last they come to some infinite multitude, it is necessary for all these to appear useful for their operations. There is nothing, said he, to prevent such from being the case. Well then, if food and drink, and clothing, and the other things which a person is about to make use of for the body, were in his power, would he want in addition gold and silver, or any thing else, by which he could obtain what was in his power? It appears to me he would not. Would it not then appear to us, that sometimes a person does not want any of those things, which relate to the needs of the body? (Yes.) For he does not want them. Hence if they appeared to be useless for this operation, they could not, on the other hand, be deemed to appear useful. For it has been laid down, that it is not possible for things to be at one time useful, and at another useless, as regards the same operation. In this way at least, said he, the same reasoning would hold good to both you and me. For if these were at any time useful for this purpose, it never would happen for them to be on the other hand useless. But now to some operations of depraved doings, but to others of good. I should say so. Is it not possible then for a depraved act to be useful for the working out of some good ? It does not seem so to myself at least. But good acts we should say are those, which a man does through virtue. I admit it. Is it not possible for a person to learn some of the things, which are taught by conversation, although he were deprived of hearing, or any thing else? By Zeus, it does not seem so to me at least. Hence, of the things useful for virtue hearing would appear to be one, if at least virtue is to be taught by hearing, and we make use of it for instruction. It appears so. Hence, if medical art is able to cure a person diseased, even medical art would sometimes appear to be one of the things useful for virtue, if through it be furnished the power of hearing what relates to the thing to be taught. There is nothing to prevent it. If then again we obtain medical science in return for property, even property would appear to be useful for virtue. Yes, said he ; for such it is. Hence, again, in like manner, that (would be useful), by which we could obtain property. Yes, all such by all means. Now does it not seem to you that a person could from acts depraved and disgraceful obtain for himself silver, in return for which he might obtain medical science, or be able to hear, after being unable ? and to use that very (hearing) for virtue, or any other things of that kind ? To me at least it does seem very much so. Would not then the depraved be useful for virtue ? It would. It is not necessary then for those things, by which we can obtain what is useful for each, to be themselves useful for the same. For things depraved would sometimes seem to be useful for a thing that is good. And they would be still more evident in this case. For if these are useful for each (of those), without which they would not exist, unless these had existed previously, come (say), how shall we speak of things of this kind ? Is it possible for ignorance to be useful for science, or disease for health, or vice for virtue ? I should say, not. And yet we should agree in this, that it is impossible for science to be produced in him, in whom ignorance had not existed previously; or health, in him, in whom disease had not (existed); or virtue, in him in whom vice had not. The fact, said he, is so, as it seems to me. Hence it would not be necessary for those things to be useful, without which a thing is not able to exist. For (otherwise) ignorance would appear to be useful for science; and disease, for health ; and vice, for virtue. Of these arguments too he was very hard of belief, unless all these things shall be property. And I, knowing him thoroughly, that it would be an equally hard task to convince him, as, according to the saying, to boil a stone, said— Let us bid a long farewell to these arguments; since we are unable to agree, whether the same things are useful, and a property, or not. But how shall we say on this question? Whether shall we consider a person happier and better, who is in want of the greatest number of things necessary for his body and living, or him, who (is in want) of the fewest and most trifling ? Now this question would perhaps be viewed in the best manner, thus. Should one compare a person himself with himself, and consider which of his states is the better, whether, when he happens to be ill, or in health. But this at least, said he, does not require any great consideration. For perhaps, said I, it is easy for every simpleton to know5 that the state of the person in health is better than that of the person ill. Well then, at what time do we happen to be in want of things more in number and variety ? when we are ill, or in health ? When we are ill. When therefore we happen to be lying in the worst condition for ourselves, we then are greatly in the desire, and the want of the greatest number of things that relate to the pleasures of the body. It is so. According to the same rule then, as a person is in the best condition for himself, when he is in want of the fewest of these things, so on the other hand, if there were two persons, one of whom happened to be greatly in the desire and want of many things, and the other of few things and moderately so, as for example things of this kind, such men as are dice-players, others wine-tipplers, and others of a voracious appetite, for all these happen to be nothing else than desires. Very much so. Now all desires are nothing else than the want of some things. (Nothing). The persons then, who have suffered the most of these, are in a more depraved state than those, who have suffered things of this kind either not at all, or to the least extent. I consider then persons of this kind to be very depraved ; and the more they are of this kind, the more depraved. It seems then to us that it is not possible for these things to be useful for this purpose, unless we happen to be in the want of these things for this purpose. I admit it. It is necessary then, if these are about to be useful to us for the care of the wants of the body, that we too should want them for this purpose. So it seems at least to me. He then, to whom the greatest number of things useful for this purpose belongs, would appear to be in want of the greatest number for this purpose, since it is necessary for him to feel a want of all useful things. To me at least it seems to appear in this way. It is necessary therefore, according to this reasoning, for those, to whom there happens to be much property, to be in much want of the things necessary for the care of the body. For the things useful for this purpose have appeared to be property ; so that of necessity they, who should appear to us to be the wealthiest, are in the most depraved state, since they are in want of the greatest number of things of this kind.