[1316b] [31]

1We have already discussed2 how many and what are the varieties of the deliberative body or sovereign power in the state, and of the system of magistracies and of law-courts, and which variety is adapted to which form of constitution, and also3 the destruction of constitutions and their preservation, from what sort of people they originate and what are their causes. But as a matter of fact since there have come into existence several kinds of democracy and similarly of the other forms of constitution, it will be well at the same time to consider4 any point that remains about these varieties, and also determine the mode of organization appropriate and advantageous for each. And further we must also investigate5 the combinations of all the modes of organizing the actual departments of state that have been mentioned,6 [1317a] [1] for these modes when coupled together make the constitutions overlap, so as to produce oligarchical aristocracies and republics inclining towards democracy. I refer to the combinations which ought to be investigated but have not at present been studied, for example if the deliberative body and the system of electing magistrates are organized oligarchically but the regulations as to the law-courts aristocratically, or these and the structure of the deliberative body oligarchically and the election of magistracy aristocratically, or if in some other manner not all the parts of the constitution are appropriately combined.

Now it has been stated before7 what kind of democracy is suited to what kind of state, and similarly which of the kinds of oligarchy is suited to what kind of populace, and also which of the remaining constitutions is advantageous for which people; but nevertheless since it must not only be made clear which variety of these constitutions is best for states, but also how both these best varieties and the other forms must be established, let us briefly pursue the subject. And first let us speak about democracy; for at the same time the facts will also become clear about the opposite form of constitution, that is, the constitution which some people call oligarchy.8

And for this inquiry we must take into view all the features that are popular and that are thought [20] to go with democracies; for it comes about from combinations of these that the kinds of democracy are formed, and that there are different democracies and more than one sort. In fact there are two causes for there being several kinds of democracy, first the one stated before, the fact that the populations are different （for we find one multitude engaged in agriculture and another consisting of handicraftsmen and day-laborers, and when the first of these is added to the second and again the third to both of them it not only makes a difference in that the quality of the democracy becomes better or worse but also by its becoming different in kind）; and the second cause is the one about which we now speak. For the institutions that go with democracies and seem to be appropriate to this form of constitution make the democracies different by their combinations; for one form of democracy will be accompanied by fewer, another by more, and another by all of them. And it is serviceable to ascertain each of them both for the purpose of instituting whichever of these kinds of democracy one happens to wish and for the purpose of amending existing ones. For people setting up constitutions seek to collect together all the features appropriate to their fundamental principle, but in so doing they make a mistake, as has been said before in the passage dealing with the causes of the destruction and the preservation of constitutions. And now let us state the postulates, the ethical characters and the aims of the various forms of democracy.

Now a fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in liberty, [1317b] [1] for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich, because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is sovereign. This then is one mark of liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution. And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes to equalitarian liberty.9 And these principles having been laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all; government of each by all, [20] and of all by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few; or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters （and a council is the most democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty of pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this one10）; also payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts, magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are bound11 to have common mess tables. Also inasmuch as oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life, [1318a] [1] and if any life-office has been left after an ancient revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election by lot for election by vote.

These12 then are the features common to democracies. But what is thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic, and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty. But the question follows, how will they have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five hundred13? or is equality on this principle14 not to be arranged in this manner, but the division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads?15 For democrats say that justice is whatever seems good to the larger number, [20] but advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount of property. But both views involve inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men,16 according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich minority, as has been said before.17 What form of equality therefore would be one on which both parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority of the citizens ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose total property assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if there are ten rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on either side are added together carries the voting.18 But if the totals fall out exactly equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided; [1318b] [1] either a decision must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper hand pay no attention to them.

There being four kinds of democracy, the best is the one that stands first in structure, as was said in the discourses preceding these19; it is also the oldest of them all, but by first I mean first as it were in a classification of the kinds of common people. The best common people are the agricultural population, so that it is possible to introduce democracy as well as other forms of constitution where the multitude lives by agriculture or by pasturing cattle. For owing to their not having much property they are busy, so that they cannot often meet in the assembly, while owing to their having20 the necessaries of life they pass their time attending to their farm work and do not covet their neighbors' goods, but find more pleasure in working than in taking part in politics and holding office, where the profits to be made from the offices are not large; for the mass of mankind are more covetous of gain than of honor. And this is indicated by the fact that men endured the tyrannies of former times, and endure oligarchies, if a ruler does not prevent them from working or [20] rob them; for then some of them soon get rich and the others free from want. And also, if they have any ambition, to have control over electing magistrates and calling them to account makes up for the lack of office, since in some democracies even if the people have no part in electing the magistrates but these are elected by a special committee selected in turn out of the whole number, as at Mantinea, yet if they have the power of deliberating on policy, the multitude are satisfied. （And this too must be counted as one form of democracy, on the lines on which it once existed at Mantinea.） Indeed it is for this reason that it is advantageous for the form of democracy spoken of before, and is a customary institution in it, for all the citizens to elect the magistrates and call them to account, and to try law-suits, but for the holders of the greatest magistracies to be elected and to have property-qualifications, the higher offices being elected from the higher property-grades, or else for no office to be elected on a property-qualification, but for officials to be chosen on the ground of capacity. And a state governed in this way is bound to be governed well （for the offices will always be administered by the best men with the consent of the people and without their being jealous of the upper classes）, and this arrangement is certain to be satisfactory for the upper classes and notables, for they will not be under the government of others inferior to themselves, and they will govern justly because a different class will be in control of the audits—since it is expedient to be in a state of suspense and not to be able to do everything exactly as seems good to one, for liberty to do whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every man's character. [1319a] [1] Hence there necessarily results the condition of affairs that is the most advantageous in the government of states—for the upper classes to govern without doing wrong, the common people not being deprived of any rights. It is manifest therefore that this is the best of the forms of democracy, and why this is so—namely, because in it the common people are of a certain kind.

For the purpose of making the people an agricultural community, not only were some of the laws that were enacted in many states in early times entirely serviceable, prohibiting the ownership of more than a certain amount of land under any conditions or else of more than a certain amount lying between a certain place and the citadel or city （and in early times at all events in many states there was even legislation prohibiting the sale of the original allotments; and there is a law said to be due to Oxylus21 with some similar provision, forbidding loans secured on a certain portion of a man's existing estate）, but at the present day it would also be well to introduce reform by means of the law of the Aphytaeans, as it is serviceable for the purpose of which we are speaking; the citizens of Aphytis22 although numerous and possessing a small territory nevertheless are all engaged in agriculture, for they are assessed not on the whole of their estates, but on divisions of them so small that even the poor can exceed the required minimum in their assessments.23

After the agricultural community [20] the best kind of democracy is where the people are herdsmen and get their living from cattle; for this life has many points of resemblance to agriculture, and as regards military duties pastoral people are in a very well trained condition and serviceable in body and capable of living in the open. But almost all the other classes of populace, of which the remaining kinds of democracy are composed, are very inferior to these, for their mode of life is mean, and there is no element of virtue in any of the occupations in which the multitude of artisans and market-people and the wage-earning class take part, and also owing to their loitering about the market-place and the city almost all people of this class find it easy to attend the assembly; whereas the farmers owing to their being scattered over the country do not attend, and have not an equal desire for this opportunity of meeting. And where it also happens that the lie of the land is such that the country is widely separated from the city, it is easy to establish a good democracy and also a good constitutional government, for the multitude is forced to live at a distance on the farms; and so, even if there is a crowd that frequents the market-place, it is best in democracies not to hold assemblies without the multitude scattered over the country.24

It has then been stated how the best and first kind of democracy is to be organized, and it is clear how we ought to organize the other kinds also. For they must diverge in a corresponding order, and at each stage we must admit the next inferior class. [1319b] [1] The last kind of democracy, because all the population share in the government, it is not within the power of every state to endure, and it is not easy for it to persist if it is not well constituted in its laws and customs （but the things that result in destroying both this state and the other forms of constitution have been nearly all of them spoken of before25）. With a view to setting up this kind of democracy and making the people powerful their leaders usually acquire as many supporters as possible and admit to citizenship not only the legitimate children of citizens but also the base-born and those of citizen-birth on one side, I mean those whose father or mother is a citizen; for all this element is specially congenial to a to democracy of this sort. Popular leaders therefore regularly introduce such institutions; they ought however only to go on adding citizens up to the point where the multitude outnumbers the notables and the middle class and not to go beyond that point; for if they exceed it they make the government more disorderly, and also provoke the notables further in the direction of being reluctant to endure the democracy, which actually took place and caused the revolution at Cyrene26; for a small base element is overlooked, but when it grows numerous it is more in evidence. [20] A democracy of this kind will also find useful such institutions as were employed by Cleisthenes27 at Athens when he wished to increase the power of the democracy, and by the party setting up the democracy at Cyrene; different tribes and brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously existing groups of associates. Moreover the characteristics of a tyranny also are all thought to be democratic, I mean for instance licence among slaves, which may really be advantageous for the popular party up to a point, and among women and children, and indulgence to live as one likes; a constitution of this sort will have a large number of supporters, as disorderly living is pleasanter to the mass of mankind than sober living.

But it is not the greatest or only task of the legislator or of those who desire to construct a constitution of this kind merely to set it up, but rather to ensure its preservation; for it is not difficult for any form of constitution to last for one or two or three days. We must therefore employ the results obtained in the inquiries that we have made already28 into the causes of the preservation and the destruction of constitutions, and attempt in the light of those results to establish the safety of the state, carefully avoiding the things that cause destruction, and enacting such laws both written and unwritten [1320a] [1] as shall best compass the results preservative of constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time. But the demagogues of today to court the favor of the peoples often use the law-courts to bring about confiscations of property. Hence those who are caring for the safety of the constitution must counteract this by enacting that nothing belonging to persons condemned at law shall be confiscated and liable to be carried to the public treasury, but that their property shall be consecrated to the service of religion; for male-factors will be no less on their guard, as they will be punished just the same, while the mob will less often vote guilty against men on trial when it is not going to get anything out of it. Also they must always make the public trials that occur as few as possible, checking those who bring indictments at random by big penalties; for they do not usually indict men of the people but notables, whereas even with this form of constitution it is desirable for all the citizens if possible to be friendly to the state, or failing that, at all events not to think of their rulers as enemies. And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of democracy tend to have large populations and it is difficult for their citizens to sit in the assembly without pay, and this in a state where there do not happen to be revenues is inimical to the notables [20] （for pay has to be obtained from a property-tax and confiscation, and from corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the overthrow of many democracies before now）,—where therefore there happen to be no revenues, few meetings of the assembly must be held, and the law-courts must consist of many members but only sit a few days （for this not only contributes to the rich not being in fear of the cost of the system even if the well-off do not take the pay and only the poor do, but also leads to far greater efficiency in the trial of law-suits, for the well-to-do, though not wishing to be away from their private affairs for many days, are willing to leave them for a short time）, while where there are revenues men must not do what the popular leaders do now （for they use the surplus for doles, and people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in it29）, but the truly democratic statesman must study how the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes democracy to be corrupt. Measures must therefore be contrived that may bring about lasting prosperity. And since this is advantageous also for the well-to-do, the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to serve as capital for trade or husbandry, [1320b] [1] and if this is not possible for all, at all events to distribute the money by tribes or some other division of the population in turn, while in the meantime the well-to-do must contribute pay for attendance at the necessary assemblies, being themselves excused from useless public services. By following some such policy as this the Carthaginians have won the friendship of the common people; for they constantly send out some of the people to the surrounding territories and so make them well-off. And if the notables are men of good feeling and sense they may also divide the needy among them in groups and supply them with capital to start them in businesses. It is also a good plan to imitate the policy30 of the Tarentines. They get the goodwill of the multitude by making property communal for the purpose of use by the needy31; also they have divided the whole number of their magistracies into two classes, one elected by vote and the other filled by lot,—the latter to ensure that the people may have a share in them, and the former to improve the conduct of public affairs. And it is also possible to effect this by dividing the holders of the same magistracy into two groups, one appointed by lot and the other by vote.

We have then said how democracies should be organized.

It is also fairly clear from these considerations how oligarchies ought to be organized. We must infer them from their opposites, reasoning out each form of oligarchy [20] with reference to the form of democracy opposite to it, starting with the most well-blended and first form of oligarchy32—and this is the one near to what is called a constitutional government, and for it the property-qualifications must be divided into one group of smaller properties and another of larger ones, smaller properties qualifying their owners for the indispensable offices and larger ones for the more important; and a person owning the qualifying property must be allowed to take a share in the government,—introducing by the assessment a large enough number of the common people to secure that with them the governing class will have a majority over those excluded; and persons to share in the government must constantly be brought in from the better class of the common people. And the next form of oligarchy also must be constructed in a similar way with a slight tightening up of the qualification. But the form of oligarchy that stands opposite to the last form of democracy, the most autocratic and tyrannical of the oligarchies, in as far as it is the worst requires a correspondingly great amount of safe-guarding. For just as human bodies in a good state of health and ships well equipped with their crews for a voyage admit of more mistakes without being destroyed thereby, but bodies of a morbid habit and vessels strained in their timbers and manned with bad crews cannot endure even the smallest mistakes, so also the worst constitutions need the most safe-guarding. [1321a] [1] Democracies therefore generally speaking are kept safe by the largeness of the citizen-body, for this is the antithesis of justice according to desert; but oligarchy on the contrary must manifestly obtain its security by means of good organization.

And since the mass of the population falls principally into four divisions, the farming class, artisans, retail traders and hired laborers, and military forces are of four classes, cavalry, heavy infantry, light infantry and marines, in places where the country happens to be suitable for horsemanship, there natural conditions favor the establishment of an oligarchy that will be powerful （for the security of the inhabitants depends on the strength of this element, and keeping studs of horses is the pursuit of those who own extensive estates）; and where the ground is suitable for heavy infantry, conditions favor the next form of oligarchy （for heavy infantry is a service for the well-to-do rather than the poor）; but light infantry and naval forces are an entirely democratic element. As things are therefore, where there is a large multitude of this class, when party strife occurs the oligarchs often get the worst of the struggle; and a remedy for this must be adopted from military commanders, who combine with their cavalry and heavy infantry forces a contingent of light infantry. And this is the way33 in which the common people get the better over the well-to-do in outbreaks of party strife: [20] being unencumbered they fight easily against cavalry and heavy infantry. Therefore to establish this force out of this class is to establish it against itself, but the right plan is for the men of military age to be separated into a division of older and one of younger men, and to have their own sons while still young trained in the exercises of light and unarmed troops, and for youths selected from among the boys to be themselves trained in active operations. And the bestowal of a share in the government upon the multitude should either go on the lines stated before,34 and be made to those who acquire the property-qualification, or as at Thebes, to people after they have abstained for a time from mechanic industries, or as at Marseilles, by making a selection among members of the governing classes and those outside it of persons who deserve35 inclusion. And furthermore the most supreme offices also, which must be retained by those within the constitution, must have expensive duties attached to them, in order that the common people may be willing to be excluded from them, and may feel no resentment against the ruling class, because it pays a high price for office. And it fits in with this that they should offer splendid sacrifices and build up some public monument on entering upon office, so that the common people sharing in the festivities and seeing the city decorated both with votive offerings and with building may be glad to see the constitution enduring; and an additional result will be that the notables will have memorials of their outlay. But at present the members of oligarchies do not adopt this course but the opposite, for they seek the gains of office just as much as the honor; hence these oligarchies are well described as miniature democracies.36 [1321b] [1] Let this then be a description of the proper way to organize the various forms of democracy and of oligarchy.

As a consequence of what has been said there follow satisfactory conclusions to the questions concerning magistracies—how many and what they should be and to whom they should belong, as has also been said before.37 For without the indispensable38 magistracies a state cannot exist, while without those that contribute to good order and seemliness it cannot be well governed. And furthermore the magistracies are bound to be fewer in the small states and more numerous in the large ones, as in fact has been said before39; it must therefore be kept in view what kinds of magistracies it is desirable to combine and what kinds to keep separate. First among the indispensable services is the superintendence of the market, over which there must be an official to superintend contracts and good order; since it is a necessity for almost all states that people shall sell some things and buy others according to one another's necessary requirements, and this is the readiest means of securing self-sufficiency, which seems to be the reason for men's having united into a single state. Another superintendency connected very closely with this one is the curatorship of public and private properties in the city, [20] to secure good order and the preservation and rectification of falling buildings and roads, and of the bounds between different persons' estates, so that disputes may not arise about them, and all the other duties of superintendence similar to these. An office of this nature is in most states entitled that of City-controller, but it has several departments, each of which is filled by separate officials in the states with larger populations, for instance Curators of Walls, Superintendents of Wells, Harbors-guardians. And another office also is indispensable and closely akin to these, for it controls the same matters but deals with the country and there regions outside the city; and these magistrates are called in some places Land-controllers and in others Custodians of Forests. These then are three departments of control over these matters, while another office is that to which the revenues of the public funds are paid in, the officials who guard them and by whom they are divided out to the several administrative departments; these magistrates are called Receivers and Stewards. Another magistracy is the one that has to receive a written return of private contracts and of the verdicts of the law-courts; and with these same officials the registration of legal proceedings and their institution have also to take place. In some states this office also is divided into several, but there are places where one magistracy controls all these matters; and these officials are called Sacred Recorders, Superintendents, Recorders, and other names akin to these. And after these is the office connected with it but perhaps the most indispensable and most difficult of all, the one concerned with the execution of judgement upon persons cast in suits and those posted as defaulters according to the lists, [1322a] [1] and with the custody of prisoners. This is an irksome office because it involves great unpopularity, so that where it is not possible to make a great deal of profit out of it men will not undertake it, or when they have undertaken it are reluctant to carry out its functions according to the laws; but it is necessary, because there is no use in trials being held about men's rights when the verdicts are not put into execution, so that if when no legal trial of disputes takes place social intercourse is impossible, so also is it when judgements are not executed. Hence it is better for this magistracy not to be a single office but to consist of several persons drawn from different courts, and it is desirable similarly to try to divide up the functions connected with the posting up of people registered as public debtors, and further also in some cases for the sentences to be executed by magistrates, especially by the newly elected ones preferably in suits tried by the outgoing ones, and in those tried by men actually in office for the magistrate executing the sentence to be different from the one that passed it, for instance the City-controllers to execute the judgements passed on from the Market-controllers and other magistrates those passed on by the City-controllers. For the less odium involved for those who execute the judgements, the more adequately the judgements will be carried out; so for the same magistrates to have imposed the sentence and to execute it involves a twofold odium, and for the same ones to execute it in all cases makes them the enemies of everybody. And in many places also the office of keeping custody of prisoners, for example at Athens the office of the magistrates known as the Eleven40, [20] is separate from the magistracy that executes sentences. It is better therefore to keep this also separate, and to attempt the same device with regard to this as well. For though it is no less necessary than the office of which I spoke, yet in practice respectable people avoid it most of all offices, while it is not safe to put it into the hands of the base, for they themselves need others to guard them instead of being able to keep guard over others. Hence there must not be one magistracy specially assigned to the custody of prisoners nor must the same magistracy perform this duty continuously, but it should be performed by the young, in places where there is a regiment of cadets41 or guards, and by the magistrates, in successive sections.

These magistracies therefore must be counted first as supremely necessary, and next to them must be put those that are not less necessary but are ranked on a higher grade of dignity, because they require much experience and trustworthiness; in this class would come the magistracies concerned with guarding the city and those assigned to military requirements. And both in peace and in war it is equally necessary for there to be magistrates to superintend the guarding of gates and walls and the inspection and drill of the citizen troops. In some places therefore there are more magistracies assigned to all these duties, and in others fewer—for instance in the small states there is one to deal with all of them. And the officers of this sort are entitled Generals or War-lords. [1322b] [1] And moreover if there are also cavalry or light infantry or archers or a navy, sometimes a magistracy is appointed to have charge of each of these arms also, and they carry the titles of Admiral, Cavalry-commander and Taxiarch, and also the divisional commissions subordinate to these of Captains of Triremes, Company-commanders and Captains of Tribes, and all the subdivisions of these commands. But the whole of this sort of officers constituted a single class, that of military command. This then is how the matter stands in regard to this office; but inasmuch as some of the magistracies, if not all, handle large sums of public money, there must be another office to receive an account and subject it to audit, which must itself handle no other business; and these officials are called Auditors by some people, Accountants by others, Examiners by others and Advocates by others. And by the side of all these offices is the one that is most supreme over all matters, for often the same magistracy has the execution of business that controls its introduction, or presides over the general assembly in places where the people are supreme; for the magistracy that convenes the sovereign assembly is bound to be the sovereign power in the state. It is styled in some places the Preliminary Council because it considers business in advance, but where there is a democracy42 it is more usually called a Council. This more or less completes the number of the offices of a political nature; but another kind of superintendence is that concerned with divine worship; in this class are priests and superintendents of matters [20] connected with the temples, the preservation of existing buildings and the restoration of those that are ruinous, and the other duties relating to the gods. In practice this superintendence in some places forms a single office, for instance in the small cities, but in others it belongs to a number of officials who are not members of the priesthood, for example Sacrificial Officers and Temple-guardians and Stewards of Sacred Funds. And connected with this is the office devoted to the management of all the public festivals which the law does not assign to the priests but the officials in charge of which derive their honor from the common sacrificial hearth, and these officials are called in some places Archons, in others Kings and in others Presidents. To sum up therefore, the necessary offices of superintendence deal with the following matters : institutions of religion, military institutions, revenue and expenditure, control of the market, citadel, harbors and country, also the arrangements of the law-courts, registration of contracts, collection of fines, custody of prisoners, supervision of accounts and inspections, and the auditing of officials, and lastly the offices connected with the body that deliberates about public affairs. On the other hand, peculiar to the states that have more leisure and prosperity, and also pay attention to public decorum, are the offices of Superintendent of Women, Guardian of the Laws, Superintendent of Children, Controller of Physical Training, [1323a] [1] and in addition to these the superintendence of athletic and Dionysiac contests and of any similar displays that happen to be held. Some of these offices are obviously not of a popular character, for instance that of Superintendent of Women and of Children; for the poor having no slaves are forced to employ their women and children as servants. There are three offices which in some states supervise the election of the chief magistrates—Guardians of the Laws, Preliminary Councillors and Council; of these the Guardians of the Laws are an aristocratic institution, the Preliminary Councillors oligarchic, and a Council democratic.

We have now therefore spoken in outline about almost all the offices of state.

1 Book 7 in some editions, Book 8 in others.

2 Book 4, 1297b 35 ff.

3 Book 5.

4 1318b—1319a 6.

5 These topics do not occur in the extant work.

6 i.e. the deliberative, executive and judicial, see 1297b 41 ff.

7 1296b 13—1297a 13.

8 ‘Rule of the few,’ i.e. the few rich, but the name is not exact, for in aristocracy also the rulers are few.

9 This clause is obscure: perhaps it is an interpolation.

10 Book 4, 1299b 38 ff. （Books 4. and 5. are regarded as forming one treatise）.

11 i.e. owing to the nature of their duties, and by general custom.

12 The rest of the chapter is most obscure, and its authenticity is questioned.

13 i.e. two groups of voters, with equal total wealth and total voting-power, but one group twice as numerous as the other, so that a man in the rich group has two votes and one in the poor group one, the former being on the average twice as rich as the latter.

14 i.e. ‘equality in proportion to number.’

15 i.e. ‘one man one vote.’

16 i.e. apparently, more than the property of all the others put together.

17 1281a 14.

18 If the rich citizens are on the average twice as wealthy as the poor （1.11）, and therefore a rich man has two votes to a poor man's one, when 6 rich and 5 poor vote one way, and 15 poor and 4 rich the other, the division is 17 to 23, and the view of the latter party, which is carried, represents a larger total of wealth but a larger proportion of poor men.

19 Cf. 4, 1291b 30-41, 1292b 25-33.

20 The MSS. give ‘not having,’ but editors do not explain how in that case people would avoid starvation.

21 Leader of the Heraclidae in their invasion of the Peloponnese, and afterwards king of Elis.

22 Aphytis was on the Isthmus of Pallene in Macedonia.

23 No satisfactory explanation seems to have been suggested of what this means.

24 i.e. in a largely agricultural democracy, even though there may be a considerable idle population, which would attend frequent assemblies, it is best to hold them infrequently, so as to secure the attendance of the farmers.

25 In Book 5.

26 In N. Africa. Diodorus （Diod. 14.34） describes a revolution there in 401 B.C., when five hundred of the rich were put to death and others fled, but after a battle a compromise was arranged.

27 See 1275b 36 n.

28 Book 5.

29 The fifty daughters of Danaus were married to their cousins, and all but one murdered their husbands on the bridal night, and were punished in Hades by having to pour water into the jar described.

30 Cf. 1263a 35.

31 This seems to mean that the land was in private ownership, but that there was some system of poor-relief, to provide for the destitute out of the produce.

32 In contrast with the first and best form of democracy, 2 init.

33 i.e. by superior mobility.

34 4.1, 1320b 25 ff.

35 If the text is corrected it seems to mean that the list was revised from time to time and some old names taken off and new ones put on.

36 The phrase suggests that in democracy public duties are cheifly undertaken for their emoluments.

37 Book 4 ,1297b 35 ff., 1299a 3 ff.

38 Cf. 4.1.

39 Book 4, 1299b 30 ff.

40 This example looks like a mistaken note interpolated in the text. The Eleven had both functions.

41 At Athens and elsewhere young citizens from eighteen to twenty were enrolled in training corps for military instruction; these served as police and home troops.

42 Cf. 1323a 9 below. Apparently πλῆθός ἐστι stands for τὸ πλῆθος κύριόν ἐστι, but editors quote no parallel.