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The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, trans. Francis Hutcheson and James Moor, edited and with an Introduction by James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).

Marcus Aurelius: Meditations Book 8

1. This will repress the desire of vain-glory, that you cannot make the whole of your life, from your youth, appear such as became a philosopher. ’Tis known to many, as well as to your own conscience, that you were far from true wisdom. If this be your aim, you must be full of confusion: It can be no easy matter for you to gain the reputation of a philosopher. Nay, the grand purpose of your life is opposite to this view of reputation. If you know wherein true excellence consists, away with this affair of reputation, and the opinions of others. Be satisfied with this, that what remains of life, be it more or less, be spent as the constitution of your nature requires. Study this point exactly; and be solicitous about nothing else, but knowing what your nature requires, and acting accordingly. You have experienced many wanderings, without finding happiness. ’Tis not found in philosophical arguments, nor in riches, nor in fame, nor in sensuality. Not at all. Where, then, is it to be found? In acting the part which human nature requires. How shall you act thus? By retaining firmly the great maxims from which our desires and actions flow. What maxims? Those concerning good and evil: “that nothing is truly good to a man, which does not make him just, temperate, courageous, and free: and that nothing can be evil to a man, which gives him not the contrary dispositions.”

2. About every action, thus examine yourself; What sort of one is it? Shall I never repent of it? I shall presently be dead, and all these things gone. What further, then, should I desire, if my present action be such as becomes an intellectual and social being, subject to the same law with the Gods?*

3. Alexander, Caius2 Pompey, what were they in comparison with Diogenes,3 Heraclitus,4 and Socrates? These latter knew the natures of things, and their causes, and materials: And thus their governing parts were employed. As to the former, what a multitude of things were the objects of their care? To how many were they enslaved? *

4. Such men † will go on doing such actions, tho’ you should burst with indignation.

5. In the first place, be not disturbed or put into confusion. All things happen according to the nature of the whole. In a little time you shall be gone, as Hadrian,5 and Augustus.6 And, then, attentively consider the nature of what occurs to you: Remember you must persist in the purpose of being a good man. Act, then, inflexibly what suits the nature of a man, and speak always what appears to you just, and yet with calm good-nature and modesty; and without Hypocrisy.

6. ’Tis the constant business of the universal nature, to be transferring what is now here, into another place; to be changing things, and carrying them hence, and placing them elsewhere. All are changes; all are customary; you need not fear any thing new. All are subjected to the same law.

7. Every being is satisfied while it continues prospering. The rational nature is prosperous, while it assents to no false or uncertain opinion; and has its affections directed to something social and kind; and its desires and aversions turned toward these things alone which are in its power; while it embraces contentedly whatever is appointed by the universal nature. For, of that it is a part, as a leaf is a part of a tree. In these, indeed, the leaf is a part of an insensible irrational system, which can be obstructed in the intention of its nature: but the human nature is a part of that universal nature which ‡‡ cannot be obstructed, and is intelligent and just. This nature distributes, suitably to all, their proper portions of time, of matter, of active principle, of powers, and events.§ This you will find, if you don’t merely compare one circumstance of one with the corresponding circumstance in another, but consider the whole nature and circumstances of one, and compare them with the whole of another.

8. You want, perhaps, opportunity for reading. But you never want opportunity of repressing all insolence; of keeping yourself superior to pleasure, and pain, and vain-glory; and of restraining all anger against the insensible, and the ungrateful; nay, even of retaining an affectionate concern about them.

9. Let no man hear you accusing either a court-life, or your own life.

10. Repentance is a self-reproving, because we have neglected something useful. Whatever is good, must be useful in some sort, and worthy of the care of a good and honourable man. But never did such a man repent of his neglecting some opportunity of sensual pleasure: Such pleasure, therefore, is neither good nor profitable.

11. [Ask yourself thus about every thing,] What is the nature of it, according to its constitution and end? What is its substance or matter? What, as to its active principle? What is its business in the universe? How long shall it endure?

12. When you are averse to be roused from sleep, consider that it is according to your constitution, and that of human nature, to be employed in social actions. To sleep, is common to us with the brutes. What is peculiarly suited to the nature of each species, that must be most familiar, most adapted, and most delightful to it.

13. Upon each occurrence which affects the imagination, continually endeavour to apprehend its nature, and its effect upon our affections; and to reason well about it.

14. When you have to do with any one, say thus to yourself: What are this man’s maxims about good and evil, pleasure and pain, and the causes of them; about glory and infamy, death or life? If he have such maxims, there is nothing wondrous or strange, that he acts such a part. And then we shall recollect too, that he is under * a necessity of acting thus.

15. Remember, that, as it would be silly to be surprized that a fig-tree bears figs, so is it equally, to be surprized that the universe produces those things of which it was ever fruitful. ’Tis silly in a physician, to be surprized that one is fallen into a fever; or in a pilot, that the wind has turned against him.

16. Remember, it equally becomes a man truly free, to change his course, of himself, when he thinks fit, and to follow the advice of another who suggests better measures; for this is also your own action, accomplished according to your own desire, and judgment, and understanding.

17. If this matter is in your own power, Why do you act thus? If it is not, whom do you accuse? It must either be the a-toms, or the Gods. To accuse either is a piece of madness. There is nothing therefore to be accused or blamed. Correct the matter, if you can. If not, to what purpose complain? Now, nothing should be done to no purpose.

18. What dies is not gone out of the verge of the universe. If that which is dissolved stays here, and is changed, it returns to those elements, of which the world and you too consist. These too are changed, and don’t murmur at it.

19. Every thing is formed for some purpose: the horse, the vine. Why do you wonder at this? The sun too is formed for a certain office, and so are the * other Gods. For what end are you formed? For sensual enjoyments? See if the Sentiments of your soul can bear this thought.

20. As he who throws the ball, not only intends its motion and direction, but the place where it should stop; so, the nature of the whole intends the ceasing of each being, no less than its commencing and continuance. What better is the ball while ascending or descending, than when fallen or stopt? What good is it to the bubble in water that it continues? or evil, that it is broken? The same you may say of the lamps, when extinguished.

21. Turn out the inner side of this body, and view it: What shall it become when it grows old, or sickly, or dead? The applauded and the applauder, are of short continuance; the rememberer and the person remembered: And all this, too, in a little corner of one climate, where, too, all don’t agree in the characters they give; nay, few agree with themselves. And this whole earth is but a point.

22. Attend well to what is at present before you; whether it be a maxim, an action, or a speech. ’Tis just you should suffer, because you neglect your present business; and would rather become a good man to morrow, than to day.

23. Am I in action; I refer it to some benefit thence to accrue to mankind. Does any thing befall me? I accept it, as referring it to the Gods, the fountain of all things; from whom all things are ordered in a fixed series.

24. What things occur in bathing? How do they appear? Oil, sweat, dirt, water, the filth of the skin; all nauseous. Such are all parts of animal life; all the objects before us.

25. Lucilla buried Verus, and soon after was buried herself. Secunda buried Maximus, and then Secunda herself was buried. Epitynchanus buried Diotimus, and then Epitynchanus was buried.* Antoninus buried Faustina, and then Antoninus was buried. Celer buried Hadrian, and then Celer followed.8 All go the same way: Those artful men, who foretold the fates of others, or were swoln with pride, where are they now? Charax, Demetrius Platonicus, Eudaemon,9 and such others? All were but for a day; and are gone long ago. Some scarce remembered for any time after their death; some gone into a fable; and of some, even the old fable itself is vanished. Remember these things; that either this corporeal mixture must be dispersed: or that the spirit of life must be either extinguished; or removed, and brought into another place.

26. The joy of man is in doing the proper office of a man; and this consists in good-will toward his own tribe, or species, in contempt of sensual impressions; in distinguishing the profitable appearances; in considering the nature of the whole, and the things which happen according to it.

27. All of us stand in three relations: the first, toward the present immediate causes; the second toward the divine cause which effects all things; the third, toward our neighbours with whom we live.

28. Pain is either an evil to the body; and, then, let the body pronounce it to be evil; or, to the soul: But, the soul* can maintain her own serenity and calm; and not conceive pain to be evil. All judgment, intention, desire, and aversion, are within the soul; to which no evil can ascend.

29. Blot out the false imaginations; and say often to yourself thus; ’Tis now in my power to preserve my soul free from all wickedness, all lust, all confusion or disturbance. And yet, as I discern the natures of things, I can use them all in proportion to their value. Remember this noble power granted you by nature.

30. In your speeches, whether in the senate or elsewhere, aim rather at a decent dignity, than elegance; and let your speech ever be sound and virtuous.

31. The court of Augustus, his wife, daughter, grand-children, step-sons; his sister, and Agrippa, his kinsmen, intimates and friends, Arius, Maecenas;11 his physicians, sacrificers; all yielded to death. Go next, not merely to the death of one, but of a whole family or name; as that of the Pompeys; and what we meet sometimes inscribed on tombs: “This was the last of his family.” And then think; what solicitude the ancestors of such men have had, that they might leave a succession of their own posterity; and yet it was necessary, there should be a last one of that race. Thus you see the death of a whole kindred.

32.† Make yourself regular, by regulating your several actions, one by one; so that if each action answers its end, and have what perfection belongs to it, you may be satisfied. Now, in this, nothing can hinder you. But, say you, may not something external withstand me? Nothing can hinder you to act the just, the temperate, the wise part. Some external effects of your actions may be obstructed; but, then, there may arise another action of your’s, equally suited to this regularity and orderly composition of life, we are speaking of; in your acquiescence under this impediment, and your calmly converting yourself to that conduct which is in your power.12

33. Receive the gifts of fortune, without pride; and part with them, without reluctance.

34. If you have ever beheld an hand, a foot, or an head, cut off from the rest of the body, and lying dead at a distance from it: Such does one make himself, as far as he can, who repines at any event which happens, and tears himself off from the whole; or who does any thing unsociable: You are broke off from the natural unity: Nature formed you for a part of the whole; but you have cut off yourself. Yet this is glorious, that you can re-unite yourself to the whole. The Gods have granted such a power of returning again, and re-uniting with the whole, to no other parts, when they are once cut off. Consider the goodness and bounty with which God hath honoured mankind. He first put it in their power, not to be broken off from this unity; and then put it in their power, even when they are thus broken off, to return, and grow together again naturally, in the condition of parts.

35. The president nature of the whole, as it hath imparted to each rational being almost all its faculties and powers; so, this one in particular, that, as the nature of the whole converts into its use, and makes subservient to its purpose, whatever seems to withstand or oppose it, and makes it a regular part of that orderly fated series; thus, each rational being can make every impediment in its way the proper matter for itself to act upon; and can use it for its grand purpose, whatever it be.

36. Don’t confound yourself, by considering the whole of your future life; and by dwelling upon the multitude, and greatness of the pains or troubles, to which you may probably be exposed. But ask yourself about such as are present, is there any thing intolerable and unsufferable in them? You’ll be ashamed to own it. And, then, recollect, that it is neither what is past, nor what is future, which can oppress you; ’tis only what is present. And this will be much diminished, if you circumscribe or consider it by itself; and chide your own mind, if it cannot bear up against this one thing thus alone.

37. Is Panthea15 or Pergamus now sitting and wailing at the tomb of Verus? or Chabrias and Diotimus at the tomb of Hadrian? Ridiculous work this. If they were still sitting there, would their masters be sensible of it? Or if they were sensible, would it give them any pleasure? Or, if they were pleased with it, could these men be immortal, and lament for ever? Was it not destined they should grow old and die? and when they should die, what would have become of their masters? What is all this for, but a nauseous bag of blood and corruption?

38. If you have great penetration, exercise it in what is the subject of the greatest wisdom.

39. In the constitution of the rational creature, there is no virtue or excellence, destined to withstand or restrain justice; but I see temperance destined to restrain sensual pleasures.

40. If you remove your own opinions about the things which grieve you, you may presently stand on the surest ground. What is that self? ’Tis reason. I am not reason, say you. Well: let not your reason then disturb itself. But let the part which suffers form opinions concerning this matter.*

41. An obstruction of any sense is the evil of an animal; so is the obstruction of any external motion or design: There is another sort of obstruction, which is the evil of the vegetative nature. The obstruction of the understanding is, in like manner, the evil of an intelligent nature: apply all these things to yourself. Do pain or pleasure affect you? Let the sense look to it. Does any thing obstruct any external design of yours? If you have designed without the proper † reservation, this is evil to you, as you are rational: But, if you have taken in the general reservation, you are not hurt nor hindered. No other person can hinder that which is the proper work of the intelligent nature. Nor fire, nor sword, nor a tyrant, nor calumny, can reach it. When it is as a ‡ sphere complete within itself, without any corners which can be struck off by external force, it remains so.

42. It would be unjust in me to vex or grieve myself, who never willingly grieved any one.

43. One rejoices in one thing, and another in another. My joy consists in having my governing part sound; without aversion to any man, or any event incident to mankind; but beholding with a serene look, and accepting, and using, every thing in proportion to its worth.

44. Allow to yourself the little time you have. Those who rather pursue a surviving fame, don’t consider that posterity will just be such as our contemporaries, whose manners we scarce can bear: and they too will be mortal. And what is it to you, what sounds they shall make with their voices, or what opinions they shall entertain about you?

45. Take me up, and cast me where you please, I shall have my own divinity within me propitious: that is, satisfied, while its affections and actions are suited to its own structure and natural furniture. Is, then, any external event of such worth, that, on its account, my soul should suffer, and become worse than it was; becoming abject, and prostrate, as a mean suppliant; and bound as a slave along with the body, or terrified? Can you find any thing which can deserve all this?

46. Nothing can befall a man which is not a natural incident of mankind; nor to an ox, nor to a vine, nor to a stone, which is not a natural incident to these species. If, then, that alone can befall any thing, which is usual, and naturally incident to it, what cause is there for indignation? The presiding nature of the whole hath brought nothing upon you, which you cannot bear?

47. If you are grieved about anything external, ’tis not the thing itself that afflicts you, but your judgment about it; and it is in your power to correct this judgment and get quit of it. If you are grieved at any thing in your own disposition; who hinders you to correct your maxims of life? If you are grieved, because you have not accomplished some sound and virtuous design; set about it effectually, rather than be grieving that it is undone. “But some superior force withstands.” Then you have no cause of sorrow; for, the fault of the omission lyes not in you. “But, life is not worth retaining, if this be not accomplished.” Quit life, then, with the same serenity, as if you had accom-plished it; and with good-will, even toward those who withstand you.

48. Remember the governing part becomes invincible, when, collected into itself, it can be satisfied with acting only as it pleases, even when it is obstinately set upon things unreasonable. What shall it be then, when, after due deliberation, it has fixed its judgment according to reason? The soul, thus free from passions, is a strong fort; nor can a man find any stronger, to which he can fly, and become invincible for the future. He who has not discerned this, is illiterate. He who has, and does not fly to it, is miserable.

49. Pronounce no more to yourself, beyond what the appearances directly declare. ’Tis told you, that one has spoken ill of you. This alone is told you, and not that you are hurt by it. I see my child is sick; this only I see; and not also that he is in danger of dying. Dwell thus upon the first appearances, and add nothing to them, from within; and no harm befalls you: Or, rather, add what becomes one who understands the nature of all which happens in the universe.

50. Is the cucumber bitter? Throw it away. Are there thorns in the way? Walk aside. That is enough. Don’t be adding; “Why were such things in the universe?” A naturalist would laugh at you, as would a carpenter, too, or a shoe-maker, if you were finding fault, because shavings and parings of their Works are lying about in their work-houses. These artificers have places too without their work-shops, where they can throw these superfluities. But the nature of the whole has no external place for this purpose: And herein its art is wonderful, that, having circumscribed itself within certain bounds, all within it which seems corrupting, waxing old, or useless, it transforms into itself, and, out of them, makes other new forms; so as neither to need matter from without, nor want a place where to cast out its superfluities. ’Tis satisfied with its own substance, its own space, and its own art.

51. Neither appear languid and tired out in Action; nor troublesome in conversation; nor inconstant in your opinions; nor dragged away in your soul, nor sallying out by the impulse of passions; nor too much hurried in life. They slay you, cut you to pieces, pursue you with curses. Does this hinder your soul to continue pure, prudent, temperate, just? As if one standing by a clear sweet foun-tain, should reproach it, yet it ceases not to send forth its refreshing waters. Should he throw into it clay or dung; it will soon disperse them, wash them away, and become free from all pollution. How, then, shall you get this perpetual living fountain within you, and not a dead cistern? Form yourself anew each day into liberty, with tranquillity, simplicity, and a sense of what is decent and becoming.

52. He, who knows not there is an orderly universe, knows not where he is. He, who knows not for what purpose he was formed, knows not himself, and knows not the world. He, who is deficient in either of these parts of knowledge, cannot tell you for what purpose he is fitted by nature. What sort of person, then, must he appear, who pursues the applauses, or dreads the censures of men, who know not where they themselves are, nor what they are?

53. Want you to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice in an hour? Can you desire to please one, who is not pleased with himself? Is he pleased with himself, who repents of almost every thing he does?

54. Don’t content yourself in merely corresponding with the surrounding air, by breathing in it; but correspond in sentiment with that intelligence which surrounds all things. For, this * intelligence diffuses itself to all, and advances toward all those who can draw it in, no less than the air does to such as can receive it into themselves by breathing.

55. There is no universal wickedness to hurt the universe. Particular wickedness of any individual hurts not another. It hurts himself only; who, yet, has this gracious privilege, that, as soon as he heartily desires it, he may be free from it altogether.

56. To my elective power, the elective power of another is indifferent, as his animal life, or his flesh is. And how much soever we were formed for the sake of each other, yet the governing part of each one has its own proper power: otherways, the vice of another might become my proper evil or misery: God thought fit, this should not be; lest it should be in the power of another to make me unhappy.

57. The sun seems to be poured forth, and is diffused all around; but not poured out, or emptied. This diffusion is a sort of extension of its rays, and hence the† Greek word for the rays is thought to be derived. The nature of a ray you may observe, if you see it entring through some small hole into a darkened chamber. Its direction is straight; and it is reflected around, when it falls upon any solid body, which does not admit it into itself. Upon this the light is fixed, no part of it is lost, or falls aside. Now, such ought to be the direction and diffusion of your understanding, not an effusion or emptying of itself, but an extension of it toward even any obstacle that occurs: Not violently and impetuously dashing against it, nor falling aside, but terminating directly on it, and illuminating whatever will re-ceive it. Such opaque objects as will not receive and transmit the rays, deprive themselves of the splendor.

58. He who dreads death, dreads either an extinction of all sense, or dreads a different sort of sensation. If all sense is extinguished, there can be no sense of evil. If a different sort of sense is acquired, you become another sort of living creature; and don’t cease to live.

59. Men were formed for each other. Teach them better, then, or bear with them.

60. The motion of the arrow is different from that of the mind. The mind, when cautiously avoiding, or, when turning to all sides, in deliberation about what to pursue, is even then carried straight forward toward its proper mark. [viz. Acting the good part.]

61. Penetrate into the governing part of others; and lay yours open to them, to enter into it.


[* ] As, all intelligent beings are, by their nature, under the same immutable eternal law of promoting the good and perfection of the whole. This, in the supreme Being, flows essentially from his nature: in created beings, it is a gift from him.1

[* ] See IX. 29.

[† ] See, the note on B. V. 17.

[‡ ] See, IV. 1. and the note.

[§ ] See, IX. 3.

[* ] See, V. 17. VI. 27. IX. 42.

[* ] Tho’ one supreme original deity was acknowledged by almost all the better sects of the heathen philosophers, yet they conceived great numbers of superior natures, created indeed, but with very great natural excellencies, and invested with great powers of government, in certain parts of the universe. Many Christians believed the same general tenet. The heathens called those superior beings Gods, and Christians called them Angels. The heathens imagined these inferior Gods or Angels, residing in the sun, the stars, and planets. This the Christians justly denied, and keenly opposed; as it had occasioned much superstitious and idolatrous worship in the heathen world.7

[* ] These two are Antoninus Pius10 and his wife Annia Faustina.

[* ] See, B. IV. 19.13

[† ] See, B. IV. 1.14

[* ] See, B. V. 19.

[† ] See this explained, B. IV. 1.

[* ] This is a very remarkable passage; not only intimating that our dispositions to piety are the effects of the diffusive and gracious power of God; but that such is the divine goodness that he is ever ready to communicate his goodness and mercy, in the renovation of the heart, and in forming in it all holy affections, and just apprehensions of himself, to all minds which by earnest desires are seeking after him.17

[† ] The Stoics studied to find out such etymologys of words, as might make them memorial hints of some useful reflection, tho’ very different from the true critical etymologys. We had an instance, B. V. 8. of one more natural than this. Cicero gives many ridiculous instances when he is imitating their manner. The thought in this section is very obscure.18

[1.] See bk. VII, art. 56, p. 91n; bk. IX, art. 10, p. 110; bk. X, art. 13, p. 125n; and bk. X, art. 25, p. 127.

[2.] Gaius Julius Caesar.

[3.] Diogenes of Sinope, founder of the Cynic sect in the fourth century bc, appropriated by the Stoics as one of the intellectual precursors of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism.

[4.] For Heraclitus see the endnotes, bk. III, p. 173n5.

[5.] Emperor, 117–38.

[6.] The first Roman emperor (d. ad 14).

[7.] In A System of Moral Philosophy, bk. I, chap. 9, sec. XV, vol. I, p. 206, Hutcheson deplored “the vanity of Polytheism, if any ever believed a plurality of original beings. The wiser Heathens had a different Polytheism.” Marcus was clearly one of those “wiser Heathens.” It is also notable that whereas Marcus usually refers in the text to “the Gods,” Hutcheson and Moor typically find in the text evidence of Marcus’s belief in one God. See bk. V, art. 27, p. 67n; bk. IX, art. 1, p. 107, the asterisked note; bk. XII, art. 1, p. 144, the daggered note.

[8.] Insofar as these persons are identifiable, they are members of the imperial family and court.

[9.] These persons are unknown, except that Demetrius the Platonist may be the person mentioned by Lucian, On Not Listening to Slander 16 (Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 379), as a victim of slander at the court of Ptolemy XII, who came to power at Alexandria in 80 bc (Real-Encyclopädie, vol. 4, column 2844, s.v. “Demetrios 92”).

[10.] Emperor from 138 to 161.

[11.] Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, general and minister to Augustus; Areios, a Stoic who was a confidant of Augustus (Brill’s New Pauly, vol. I, column 1158); Maecenas, friend and minister of Augustus and the patron of Virgil, Horace, and Propertius.

[12.] See bk. III, art. 11, p. 45, and bk. XI, art. 1, pp. 133–34.

[13.] At bk. IV, art. 19, p. 50n, Hutcheson had remarked that “the Stoics denyed fame to be desirable, except as it gave opportunities of more extensive good offices.” Hutcheson was observing that desires for fame and other external goods were rational and good only if such desires were directed to the good of others and the whole. Hutcheson had insisted elsewhere that the Stoics made provision for rational longing or desires of the soul. See A System of Moral Philosophy, bk. I, chap. I, sec. V, vol. I, p. 8.

[14.] This footnote does not appear in later editions. Hutcheson’s note makes it clear that he considered this article (bk. VIII, art. 32) to be another use of the Stoic concept of reservation explained above at bk. IV, art. 1, p. 47n, and again at bk. V, art. 20, p. 65, and bk. XI, art. 37, p. 143. Also see the endnotes, bk. IV, p. 174n1.

[15.] These persons are not certainly known, except for Panthea, who was a mistress of Marcus’s co-emperor, Verus, and is celebrated by the contemporary satirist Lucian in “Essays in portraiture” and “Essays in portraiture defended,” in Lucian, ed. and trans. Harmon, vol. IV (Loeb ed., pp. 255ff. and 297ff.).

[17.] In this note, Hutcheson appears to find in Marcus’s thinking intimations of the scholastic notion that certain of God’s attributes are communicable or may be shared with human beings. Hutcheson had described the communicable attributes in “A Synopsis of Metaphysics,” pt. III, chaps. 2 and 3, in Logic, Metaphysics, and Natural Sociability (2006), pp. 162, 174–75; in A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1747), bk. I, chap. 7, sec. III, pp. 105–7; and in A System of Moral Philosophy, bk. 1, chap. 10, sec. II, vol. I, pp. 210–11. This was a characteristic of Hutcheson’s moral philosophy that made a particular impression upon Adam Smith; see The Theory of Moral Sentiments, pt. VII, chap. 3, pp. 300–301. Smith identified this theory with the Platonists, notably with the work of the Cambridge Platonists and with the Eclectics of the early Christian centuries. It is interesting that Hutcheson should have found this theory in the thinking of a philosopher whom he took to be a Stoic, albeit a Stoic who incorporated Platonic insights in his thought.

[18.] See also bk. III, art. 15, p. 45n. The Stoics’ interest in etymology derives from their view that the meanings of words are in some sense natural rather than conventional. See Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 131–39. Cicero criticizes the Stoics’ etymologies of the gods’ names in On the Nature of the Gods, bk. III., sec. 62ff.

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